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I. Introduction
International management of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna under the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and
federal management under the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
has certainly been contentious. Atlantic bluefin tuna have been managed at the
international level by ICCAT for the past 25 years. NMFS is the organization
responsible for implementing ICCAT recommended conservation and
management measures in the United States. ICCAT has management
authority over tunas and tuna-like species including bluefin tuna, swordfish, and
marlin, but the "western" Atlantic bluefin tuna is the only species for which
ICCAT has ever recommended catch quotas. In an attempt to halt an apparent
decline in the abundance of bluefin tuna in tile western Atlantic, ICCAT has
recommended strict management measures including catch quotas, minimum
sizes, "no-sale" provisions, and spawning area protection since 1981. ICCAT
had recommended in 1993 an additional 50% reduction in the western quota
for the 1994 and 1995 fishing seasons, but at their recent 1994 meeting
decided to abandon the planned reduction and adopt a 10% increase. ICCAT
also recommended for the first time in 20 years catch restrictions in the eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean.
This research paper attempts to explain this apparent "turn-around" by
ICCAT and the events which influenced it, the most significant being the recent
repudiation of past ICCAT scientific assessments by the U.S. National Academy
of Sciences' National Research Council. This paper chronicles Atlantic bluefin
tuna management over the past 25 years at the international level under ICCAT,
and at the federal level under NMFS. The positions of the two primary interest
groups, the fishing industry and conservationists, will be reviewed and
maximum benefit to society over the long term. Fishery management for
conservation purposes has been adopted internationally and is required by the
Law of the Sea, Article 61 :
"The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence
available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in
the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over exploitation .
. . . Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce maximum
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic
factors, ... " (U.N. 1982)
Conservation of highly migratory species requires that they be managed
over the entire range of the stock. Regulatory measures applied to only a
portion of the stock will not be effective. The only way to manage bluefin tuna is
through international cooperation between the nations through which these fish
migrate, and other nations whose fishermen participate in the fishery. This has
also been recognized at the international level as evidenced by Article 64 of the
Law of the Sea which states:
"The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for
highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall co-operate directly or
through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such
species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive
economic zone." (U.N. 1982)
One of the major aspects fishery management is allocation, given the fact
that there are not enough fish for all fishermen. Allocation distributes the
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opportunity to participants in the fishery. This has always been controversial
and the decisions are always political. The NOAA Fishery Management Study
(NOAA 1986) assessed the current U.S. fishery management system created
under the Magnuson Act, which essentially left the conservation and allocation
decisions to regional councils. The study concluded that fishery management
would be significantly improved by a clear separation between conservation
and allocation decisions. Separating conservation and allocation is done for
the purpose of giving priority to maintaining the resources for future
generations. The NOAA study cons idered several alternative arrangements to
accomplish the separation of conservation and allocation, ranging from single
entities such as all-Federal and all-Private, to shared management. The study
concluded that conservation and allocation decisions could not be made by the
same body. The preferred alternative was conservation by NOAA and
allocation by the regional councils.
There are a number of general principles which should govern the
regulation of fishing (Royce 1984):
1.) Most people being regulated must agree about the need for
regulation, and how it is supposed to work. This requires a knowledge of
the resources and a respected forecast of the consequences.
2.) The regulation must be enforced else violators will destroy confidence
in its effectiveness.
3.) Joint actions are required for stocks migrating between political
jurisdictions.
4.) Regulation must be based on continuing scientific asse~sment of.t~e
condition of the stock and fishing effects. This requires reliable statistlca'
databases and an experienced scientific staff.
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5.) Regulation must be consistent on the part of all political entities, which
requires development of suitable laws in each.
6.) Regulation requires confidence on the part of the people being
regulated that the system is fair and effective.
7.) Regulation must be taken early in the development of a fishery to be
effective. Long-established fisheries are tough to regulate due to
vigorous opposition by those who expect to incur large economic losses
as a result of regulation.
These general principles are essentially common sense considerations.
Fishermen do not like to be requtated, and gaining their confidence that
regulation is going to be fair and effective is critical.
James Joseph, director of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC) , the Pacific counterpart to ICCAT, outlined several concepts that
international tuna management organizations need to follow in order to be
effective (Senate 1989):
1.) Stocks of highly migratory species must be managed over their entire
range: management over only a portion of that range cannot be effective.
2.) The basis of management must be an understanding of the biology,
population dynamics, abundance, and fishing and environmental effects
on abundance of the stock derived from scientific study which also must
apply over the range of the stock.
3.) The economics of fishing must be considered. Overcapitalized
fisheries are difficult (impossible) to manage in terms of cooperation.
4.) Enforcement of conservation measures and regulations must be
equitable and uniform if management is to be effective.
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5.) Effective management will require compromises on the part of all
nations.
Evaluation of tuna management alternatives in the past has focused on
determining to what degree they provide adequate solutions to basic accepted
tuna management problems. Four general problems associated with the
scientific study and management of tuna have been identified (Joseph and
Greenough, 1979):
1.) Collection of basic fishery statistics, biological data, and analysis.
2.) Distribution of catch between users.
3.) Rapid increase in fleet carrying capacity.
4.) Enforcement of conservation regulations adopted by involved nations.
For an international management structure like the ICCAT/NMFS bluefin
tuna management to be effective, it seems that some of these problems need to
be solved at the international level, and others at the domestic or federal level.
Scientific data collection and assessment and strict enforcement, both over the
range of the stock, need to be addressed at the international level. Fair
allocation and overcapitalization need to be solved by individual nations.
III. Fishery and Resource Descriptions
Resource
Bluefin tuna (Thunnus Thynnus) are a long-lived and rapid-growing
species. The consensus in the biological community is that these fish do not
spawn until approximately 8 years of age, and can grow as large as 1500 Ibs.
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and as old as 30 years. Bluefin tuna are one of the largest fish, and one of the
fastest, capable of burst speeds up to 55 mph. In the western Atlantic, they
range from Brazil to Newfoundland, and in the eastern Atlantic from Norway to
the Canary Islands and into the Mediterranean Sea. Two distinct spawning
areas have been identif ied; the Gulf of Mexico and the Mediterranean Sea.
Fish tagged on both sides of the Atlantic have been recaptured after completing
trans-Atlantic migrations. For assessment and management purposes ICCAT
and NMFS have grouped bluefin tuna by age, weight , and fork length into size
classes (Table 1).
Table 1, Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Designations
ICCAT NMFS
Age (Yr.) Designation Designation Length (in.) Weight (lb.)
0-1 Small Young School 0-26 <14
2-3 Small School 26-45 14-66
4-5 Small Large School 45-57 66-135
6-7 Medium Small Medium 57-70 135-235
8-9 Medium Large Medium 70-77 235-310
10+ Large Giant > 77 > 310
Fishery
The Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery would have to be considered one of the
most complex fishery management scenarios, spanning across multip le
jurisdictions (local, state, federal, and international), and comprised of several
gear types . In the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, bluefin tuna have been
exploited for thousands of years. The most significant components of the
eastern Atlantic fishery include Spanish and French baitboats, French gillnets ,
and a mid-Atlantic Japanese longline fishery. The Mediterranean fishery is
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comprised of many gear types, most employed by non-ICCAT countries.
French, Italian, Turkish, Croatian, and Tunisian purse seines take approximately
70% of the total Mediterranean catch.
In the western Atlantic, no directed bluefin fishery existed until the 1900's,
when a sport fishery for small and medium bluefin developed along the U.S.
east coast and a giant fishery developed in the Gulf of Maine and Canadian
waters. Up until 1960 the commercial fishery in the west was for the most part
incidental catch. Commercial purse seining directed at small bluefin expanded
rapidly in the 1960's to support a canning industry. The western Atlantic
longline fishery developed in the 1970's with the Japanese taking
approximately 10,000 giants from the Gulf of Mexico spawning area in a single
year.
The current U.S. Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is comprised of two separate
components, a purse seine fishery and a handgear fishery. The purse seine
fishery is comprised of 5 vessels which operate under a non-transferable
individual vessel quota system. This Iva system, which was established in
1982, splits the quota equally among those 5 vessels, and effectively excludes
new entrants from the purse seine fishery. The Iva system eliminates the rush
to fish; these 5 vessels wait for high densities of bluefin to appear each year and
fill their quotas in a few week period. The handgear fishery is open access and
is comprised primarily of harpoon and hook and line gear. This fishery is
comprised of a large number (approximately 11,000) of permitted vessels
which target all sizes of bluefin including giants. The U.S. fishery has been
categorized based primarily on gear type for management and permitting
purposes:
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CATEGORY
General
Harpoon
Angling
Purse Seine
Incidental
Reserve
DESCRIPTION
Handgear: Handline, Harpoon, or Rod & Reel
Harpoon Only
School & Medium Only
Giant & Large Medium Only
Longline/Split North and South
Discretionary
The U.S. Atlantic bluefin fishery includes a large number of permitted
vessels of which a fraction catch and sell fish. In 1993 only 10% of those
vessels with a bluefin tuna permit actually sold a bluefin (Table 2). The
General Category is characterized by a large number of fishermen catching a
small number of fish; most fishermen catch no fish at all. Of the 9336 permitted
vessels, only 8% caught and sold at least one fish. The gross revenues for this
category in 1993 were approximately $12 million, with 609 mt of bluefin landed .
The Harpoon Category is the smallest category in terms of value and volume,
with $750,000 in gross revenues in 1993 and 57 mt landed. The Purse Seine
category consists of only 5 vessels, which landed 295 mt in 1993 with gross
revenues of $5.4 million.
Table 2, 1993 NMFS Catch Statistics (NMFS 1994).
# Vessels
Catching Total Gross
# Vessel At least one Success Landings Revenues
Category Permits fish Rate (%) (rnt) (Thousands)
General 9,336 778 8% 609 $11,999
Harpoon 132 34 26% 57 $742
Purse Seine 5 5 100% 295 $5,385
Incidental 607 167 27% 85 $1314
Total 10,081 983 10% 1,046 $19,440
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A new market developed in Japan in the 1970's for fresh giant bluefin
tuna flown directly to Japanese markets, and the ex-vessel price has increased
from $0.20 per pound in the 1970's to $10-15 per pound in 1993. The average
wholesale price currently averages $15-20 per pound, and the record price
paid in 1992 for a single fresh 715 lb. bluefin was $69,273.30 ($97 per pound).
"The animal is as big as a sports car, goes from 0 to 60 about as fast as a
Porsche, and it can be worth about as much as a Porsche" (Craft, 1994). The
high ex-vessel price paid by the Japanese for fresh bluefin tuna, upwards of
$10,000 for a single prime 500-700 lb. giant, has blurred the distinction
between recreational and commercial fishing in the U.S. bluefin fishery. Most
giants, whether caught by commercial, charter boat, or recreational fishermen
end up in Japan.
The resource and fishery characterizations reveal several major
management concerns. The fact that these fish are so long-lived and do not
spawn until age 8 presents some unique management problems. Mistakes in
this fishery such as significant overfishing in the 1960's and 1970's take years
to correct, and the impact of conservation and management measures may take
tens of years to appear. The bluefin fishery has been long established
throughout the Atlantic, especially in the east, where it dates back to the ancient
Phoenicians. These "traditional" fisheries will be difficult to change. The U.S.
Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is overcapitalized, which will make management
more difficult. Finally the extremely high price paid by the Japanese for fresh
bluefin will further complicate management.
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IV. Federal Management
ICCAT recommended conservation and management measures have
been implemented at the federal level by NMFS since 1975 under the authority
of the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act (16 U.S.C. 971). The Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801) was passed in 1976 to
govern fisheries within the U.S. 200 mile exclusive economic zone, but
specifically exempted highly migratory species including bluefin tuna from its
purview. The Fishery Conservation and Management Amendments of 1990
(U.S. Public Law 101-627) amended both the Magnuson Act and the ATCA in
the area of highly migratory species management. The 1990 Amendments
gave the Secretary of Commerce for the first time management authority over
tuna in the U.S. EEZ under the Magnuson Act and also directed the Secretary to
develop and implement fishery management plans (FMPs) for Atlant ic highly
migratory species. The 1990 Amendments do not clearly address the
relationship between the Magnuson Act and the ATCA. The Secretary of
Commerce is still issuing regulations under the ATCA until an FMP for bluefin
tuna is developed and regulations issued under the Magnuson Act.
Atlantic Tunas Convention Act
Although the ICCAT convention entered into force in 1969, the first
management recommendations were not made until 1974, and were to be
implemented by the member nations in 1975. At this time the U.S. did not have
enabl ing legislat ion in place under which it could enforce ICCAT
recommendations on U.S. fishermen. The U.S. tried unsuccessfully to
implement the restrictions through NOAA under the Fish and Wildlife Act (16
U.S.C. 742) , the Marine Migratory Sportfish Act (16 U.S.C. 760), and the
Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531). Finally the Atlantic Tunas
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Convention Act was passed by Congress in 1975 which allows the Secretary of
Commerce to implement ICCAT recommendations.
The ATCA was enacted to provide the framework for U.S. participation in
ICCAT. The ATCA provides for the appointment of three U.S. Commissioners to
ICCAT along with an Advisory Committee. The Commissioners are appointed
by the President and can serve no more than two three year terms. Only one
Commissioner can be a government employee, and to date this has been a
NOAA official. The other two Commissioners represent both commercial and
recreational fishing interests. The conservation groups are not represented at
the Commissioner level. The Advisory Committee is made up of 5-20
individuals from various interest groups, including conservationists. The U.S.
ICCAT position is developed each year after consideration of scientific and
management input from a variety of sources including NMFS, its Southeast
Fisheries Center, NOAA, the Advisory Committee, and the Department of State.
The U.S. position is then negotiated at the ICCAT convention each year by the
Commissioners.
The ATCA provides the Secretary of Commerce with the authority to
adopt regulations necessary carry out the purposes and objectives of ICCAT
and the ATCA, and to promulgate regulations to carry out the recommendations
of ICCAT (16 U.S.C. 971 d). The Secretary of Commerce has delegated its
management responsibilities under the ATCA to NOAA, who has further
delegated them to NMFS. NMFS has established bluefin tuna quotas, catch
rates, seasons, and licensing requirements for U.S. fishermen pursuing bluefin
tuna since 1975.
The 1990 Amendments provide that any regulations promulgated
under the ATCA shall be consistent with FMPs implemented under the
Magnuson Act and:
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"... that no regulation promulgated under this section may have the effect
of increasing or decreasing any allocation or quota of fish to the United
States agreed to pursuant to a recommendation of the Commission."
(16 U.S.C. 971)
NMFS has argued against this provision in the ATCA that limits the Secretary of
Commerce from issuing regulations that would increase or decrease the total
ICCAT quota (House 1993a). They would like the ability to reduce domestic
quotas, unilaterally if necessary, for conservation purposes. Some ICCAT
recommendations have been applied by NMFS in a manner to further maximize
conservation efforts, such as a larger minimum size for sale of bluefin tuna in
hopes of speeding the recovery of the spawning stock. While this measure
does not violate the ICCAT quota provision, it does place an additional burden
on U.S. fishermen relative to foreign Atlantic bluefin tuna fishermen.
Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act
Under the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act the
United States claimed management authority over the fishery resources within
the U.S. 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone. From 1976 through 1992, highly
migratory species including Atlantic bluefin tuna were the exceptions to the rule.
The Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990 made fundamental changes to
the way the U.S. manages bluefin tuna under the Magnuson Act. The
exemption for highly migratory species was abolished effective January 1,
1992:
liThe United States shall cooperate directly or through appropriate
international organizations with those nations involved in fisheries for
13
l"Iighly migratory species with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting optimum utilization of such species throughout their range,
both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone ." (16 U.S.C. 1812)
The 1990 Amendments grant the Secretary of Commerce management
authority over highly migratory species on the east coast including Atlantic
bluefin tuna (16 U.S.C. 1854). These amendments also require the Secretary
to "diligently" pursue management measures through international
management entities such as ICCAT, and to prepare fishery management plans
for highly migratory species. On the west coast, these same pelagics are
managed by the regional councils. It seems that the situation on the east coast
with multiple councils , two primary user groups, and one non-user group at
odds with each other, precluded bluefin management at the council level.
The 1990 Amendments direct the Secretary of Commerce to undertake a
number of actions while preparing FMPs for highly migratory species including
conducting public hearings as well as consulting ICCAT Commissioners and
Advisory Groups, affected councils , and the Secretary of State. These actions
should include an evaluation of the effects of conservation and management
measures on affected fishery participants, and minimize any disadvantage to
U.S. fishermen in relation to foreign competitors. The conservation and
management measures contained in the highly migratory FMPs are required to
consider traditional fishing patterns of U.S. vessels and be fair and equitable in
allocating fishing privileges among U.S. fishermen. Finally the Secretary is
required to allow U.S. fishermen to catch any quota provided by international
organizations such as ICCAT:
"With respect to highly migratory species for which the United States is
authorized to harvest an allocation or quota under a relevant
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international fishery agreement, the Secretary shall provide fishing
vessels of the United States with a reasonable opportunity to harvest
such allocation or quota." (16 U.S.C. 1854)
The 1990 Amendments clearly support international management of
highly migratory species. The amendments do however mandate a change at
the federal level, by directing the development of FMPs through a public
process, and management measures consistent with the principles of the
Magnuson Act. All fishery management plans must be consistent with the
national standards and with regulations implementing recommendations by
international organizations in which the United States participates(16 U.S.C.
1851). The national standards (16 U.S.C. 1851) clearly stress fair and
equitable allocation with no one receiving and "excessive" share.
Management under the Magnuson Act has not yet materialized. I\IMFS is
still implementing ICCAT recommendations under the authority of the ATCA
because there does not exist a FMP for bluefin tuna. I\IMFS is not apparently
in any hurry to implement an FMP for bluefin, and development of the Atlantic
bluefin FMP is moving at glacial pace. It took NMFS 2 years to publish the
process by which they intend to develop the plan, and past history has shown
the start-to-finish time for FMP development to be on the order of 3-5 years.
Some controversy can be expected as interest groups attempt to influence
regulatory changes under a new era of management through domestic Fishery
Management Plans (Chase 1992).
NMFS Allocations
In August 1975 NMFS promulgated its first bluefin tuna regulations under
the ATCA in order to implement ICCAT recommendations. Tile NMFS chose to
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prohibit fishing for bluefin tuna less than 14 lb. and for bluefin 115-300 lb. (but
did allow an incidental catch), and chose to limit catch by means of a quota to
keep fishing mortality at recent levels. The purse seine vessels were limited to
1179 metric tons, and the rest of the fishery was limited to 2250 fish (>300 lb.).
To implement the 1981 ICCAT recommendations which limited the
overall U.S. catch of western bluefin to 605 mt, NMFS decided to allocate the
quota among several categories (Table 3). The major outcome in 1982 was the
elimination of the directed purse seine fishery for bluefin tuna. Two main
reasons were cited: 1.) that purse seine fishing was not suited for scientific
monitoring purposes in small localized fisheries and 2.) domestic purse seiners
are involved in other fisheries where they can catch substantial amounts of
yellowfin and skipjack tuna.
The 1982 ICCAT recommendations increased the U.S. quota for
scientific monitoring to 1387 mt, and NMFS chose to increase all segments of
the fishery by an equitable amount and reinstated the directed purse seine
fishery. NMFS stated that the purse seine category was one of the traditional
bluefin fisheries, and even though there are a small number of participants
compared to General category and recreational 'fisheries, NMFS did not believe
it should be eliminated or severely restricted.
To implement the 1991 ICCAT recommendations, NMFS chose to
spread the 10% reduction equally across the 1992 and 1993 seasons and base
its allocation on a 10% reduction of the average 1983-1991 landings in each
category. This was not simply a 10% reduction of the previous year's quota.
The net affect was that Angling category, which had historically exceeded its
quota by up to 400%, realized a 75% increase in its allocation for 1992, while
the General, Purse Seine, and Incidental categories incurred a 20% decrease.
I\IMFS also promulgated a regulation prohibiting the sale of any bluefin less
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than 70", which was beyond the ICCAT recommendation of 47". These
regulations most severely affected the Angling category, since they are only
permitted to catch fish less than 70".
The 1993 ICCAT recommendation again reduced the western Atlantic
quota by 15%, but the U.S. only realized a 1% reduction due to Japan's
forfeiting a percentage of its western share. Therefore the allocation for 1994
remained the same for each category, with the 1% reduction taken from the
Reserve Category.
Table 3, NMFS Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Allocations (rnt)
Category 1982 1983-1991 1992-1993 1994
General 258 590 531 531
Harpoon 39 54 53 53
Purse Seine 0 386 301 301
Angl ing 90 126 219 219
Incidental 195 137 113 113
Reserve 22 94 31 18
U.S. Total 605 1387 1248 1235
For the past 12 years NMFS has not changed the allocat ion percentages
among categories , with the exception in 1991 of increas ing the Angling quota to
better reflect small fish catch. They have basically stuck with proportional
reductions since the original allocat ions in 1981-82; the easiest and least
controversial method of implementing the ICCAT reductions ; but probably not
the most equitable.
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Bluefin Tuna DEIS
In preparation for implementing the proposed ICCAT quota reduction in
the western Atlantic in 1995, NMFS published a Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (NMFS 1994) for a regulatory amendment to the western Atlantic
bluefin tuna fishery which examined a wide range of allocation alternatives
under several quota levels. NMFS recognized that the proposed 1995 quota
reduction was severe enough to cause significant impact on the natural and
human environment and warrant an EIS. NMFS's objective is to implement the
ICCAT recommendation under the ATCA and remain consistent with the
National Standards contained in the Magnuson Act. The "proposed action"
identified in the DEIS was the implementation of the 1995 ICCAT quota
reduction. Tile objectives of this action were identified as:
1.) To control fishing mortality so as to ensure the long-term sustainability
of the resource, and to promote stock recovery to levels consistent with
providing the ICCAT objective of MSY.
2.) To provide the data necessary for monitoring the status of the bluefin
tuna stock.
3.) To use an interactive management process consistent with MFCMA to
determine allocation between user groups, areas and seasons,
considering historical fishing patterns, socio-economic effects, and other
relevant factors.
The DEIS identified and analyzed five potential quota levels and four
domestic allocation schemes. One of the quota levels was the pending ICCAT
recommendation, which NMFS would be required to implement in 1995. One of
the allocation schemes was the traditional proportional reduction which NMFS
has used for all prior quota adjustments. The DEIS also looked at three
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potential access control alternatives in order to address the issue of
overcapitalization of the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.
QUOTA LEVELS
A. Return to 1993 Level
B. Status Quo (1994 Level)
C. Current ICCAT Recommendation (1995)
D. Reduce Quota
E. No Fishing Alternative
DOMESTIC ALLOCATIONS
A. Status Quo (Proportional Reduction)
B. Eliminate Purse Seine Fishery
C. Eliminate Gulf of Mexico Incidental Fishery
D. Eliminate Small Fish « 70") Fishery
ACCESS CONTROLS
A. Lottery
B. Limited Entry/Fleet Quota
C. Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ)
2394 mt
1995 mt
1200 mt
800 mt
o mt
The environmental consequences of these alternatives, both biological
and socio-economic, were assessed and compared. The biological measures
used to compare alternatives were based on stock size projections and the
socio-economic measures included commercial present value, angler
consumer surplus, and employment. NMFS used a computer model to predict
these measures over a 16 year period, from 1994 to 2010. The DEIS results
are predicated upon the 1993 ICCAT stock assessment, such that any change
in that assessment would invalidate the DEIS.
In terms of biological consequences, quota levels A, B, and C all resulted
in projected declines in stock size over the next 16 years. The other two
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alternatives (0 and E) both resulted in rebuilding of the stock. For each quota
level exam ined, allocation alternative 0 (No Small Fish) increased the stock
size most rapidly. The proposed 1995 ICCAT quota recommendation of 1200
mt results in a declining stock for all allocation alternatives except for 0 (No
Small Fish). The implementation of the 50% ICCAT quota reduct ion (1200 mt)
will not rebuild the stock under any of the allocation schemes exam ined. A
reduced quota level (800 mt) or no fishing (0 mt) were required to rebuild the
stock according to this assessment.
In terms of socio-economic consequences, the traditional proportional
allocation (A) leads to the least negat ive impact on all involved , but this
alternative does not maximize the total commercial and recreational benefits.
For all the quota levels examined, allocation alternative B (No Purse Seine)
maxim izes the total economic benefits. Also allocation B could result in
increased employment, since currently the purse seine fleet of 5 vessels
commands 24% of the U.S. quota, while the 11,000 vessels in the General
category share 48%. The negative consequences of allocation B would be
those negative economic impacts associated with the elimination of the purse
seine fishery.
Tab le 4, Total Economic Benefits ($Millions) at Year 2010
Quota Levels:
Domestic Allocations
A. Proportional
B. No Purse Seine
C. No GOM Incidental
D. No Small Fish
A.
Return to
(2394 mt)
117
133
116
36
B.
Current
(1995 mt)
117
144
117
36
C.
ICCAT
(1200 mt)
133
160
130
43
D.
Reduced
(800 mt)
97
116
95
30
20
The Access Control Alternatives were intended to address the issue of
overcapitalization of the bluefin fishery by reducing the number of participants.
With only 10% of the permitted vessels landing fish in 1993, it was apparent that
this fishery was overcapitalized. Each alternative was assessed in terms of
socio-economic consequences and impacts such as employment, economic
efficiency, acceptability, cost, and equitability. The results for each alternative
varied widely, but the DEIS did conclude that a correctly designed ITQ system
would maximize economic efficiency, and that the other two alternatives would
maximize employment at lower and less stable pay.
Given the recent NRC 'findings invalidated the scientific basis of the
DEIS, the biological consequences of the quota levels and allocation
alternatives in the DEIS are meaningless. But assuming we still are going to
have some type of quota in Atlantic blustln tuna fishery, the socio-economic
consequences of the allocation alternatives are still relevant. Domestic
allocation alternative B (No Purse Seine) maximizes economic benefits and
perhaps increases employment. The ITQ access control alternative, if designed
correctly, would maximize economic efficiency.
Audubon Study
A study conducted by the Audubon Society (Nemerson, Camhi, and
Safina 1994) attempted to quantify the impact of ICCAT's proposed 50% catch
reduction on U.S. fishermen in terms of its extent and distribution. The study
assessed the effects of reallocating the reduced quota among existing
categories, and also limiting access to the fishery. Reallocation seemed
feasible because it was felt that the current allocation had a disproportionate
distribution of quota, employment, and income among categories. Limiting
access seemed to be in the interest of the fishery given the declining stock and
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increasing number of fishermen. Audubon looked at the following four
allocation schemes:
1.) 1992 NMFS (current distribution)
2.) Direct Employment
3.) Direct plus Indirect Employment
4.) No Purse Seine Category
The 1992 NMFS allocation scheme would simply cut the quota in half
without changing the percentage allocation among categories. The Direct
Employment scheme based allocation on the number of people directly
employed (fishermen) in each category. Because the General Category by far
employs the most fishermen, it would receive the largest increase in allocation.
Basing the allocation on Direct and Indirect Employment, which includes land-
based associated activities such as marinas, tackle shops, and charter boats,
results in the largest increase for the Angling Category. Any reallocation
scheme that seeks to bring quota allocation in line with employment distribution
among sectors will transfer quota away from the Purse Seine category where
3% of the workforce, which equates to less than 10 full-time employees,
currently receives 24% of the quota.
Table 5, Audubon Quota Reallocation Percentages
Category 1992 NMFS Direct Direct & Indir. No Purse Seine
General 41.2% 68.2% 51.2% 57.4%
Harpoon 4.2% 5.6% 4.3% 5.7%
Incidental 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8%
Purse Seine 23.7% 2.4% 1.9% 0%
Angling 17.2% 10.6% 29.5% 23.7%
Reserve 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
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There were two approaches used to limit access within each category.
The "top-down" method retained the highest earners, and the "bottom-up"
retained the more numerous low earners . Access was further limited by either
maintaining the 1992 average income per fisherman, or reducing that income
by 25% to expand access. The Top Down-Maintained Income approach
minimized the number of fishermen in the fishery and maximized average
income. Conversely the Bottom Up-25% Income Cut provided the widest
commercial access at the lowest average income.
Both the NMFS DEIS and Audubon Study show an inequitable
distribution of the ICCAT quota, and both show potential benefits by reallocating
that quota. Enhancing employment and maximizing economic value are two of
the main objectives of fishery management. Eliminating or simply bringing the
purse seine quota into line with employment results in fairer distribution,
increased economic benefits, and perhaps increased employment. A large
economic impact will be incurred by a few individuals, who have reaped
substantial benefits over the past 12 years at the expense of other participants.
The purse seine fishery probably cannot be eliminated or reduced without
litigation . These purse seine vessels have in the past challenged their
exclusion from state waters in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts (Chase
1993).
Clearly too much fishing capacity exists than needed to harvest the
ICCAT quota, and too many participants exist to allow them to make a
reasonable profit. Limiting access to the fishery was shown to be warranted in
both studies, and should maximize economic value. NMFS is considering
limiting access into the Atlantic tuna fishery, and has taken the first step by
setting a control date (59 FR 45262 1994). NMFS feels that the Atlantic tuna
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fisheries, including bluefin tuna, are overutilized and overcapitalized and has
effectively closed these fisheries to commercial boats not in the fishery as of
September 1, 1994. NMFS is attempting to discourage new entries into the
fishery based on economic speculation. The control date is set before planning
begins for limited access regimes to help distinguish established tuna
fishermen from speculative entrants.
v. International Management
ICCAT History
Management of bluefin tuna began when the International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas was opened for signature on May 14,
1966 in Rio de Janeiro amid concern over the rate of exploitation and declining
abundance of Atlantic tuna stocks. The convention was ratified by the U.S. in
1967 and entered into force March 23, 1969 and originally consisted of 16
member nations including the United States, Canada, and Japan. There are
currently 22 member nations. ICCAT's objective is to maintain populations of
tunas and tuna-like species at levels which would permit maximum sustainable
catch. Its two main responsibilities are scientific stock assessment and
recommendation of conservation and management measures.
The Commission proposes conservation measures in the form of
recommendations, which are non-binding, to member nations designed to meet
its objective of maximum sustainable catch. There are two groups within ICCAT
which support the Commission; the Panels, and the Scientific Committee on
Research and Statistics (SCRS). The SCRS is composed of scientists and
biologists from member nations and conducts annual stock assessments. The
Panels are broken up by species, and are made up of representatives from the
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member nations who fish those particular species. Proposals are submitted by
individual member nations under the Panel forum, deliberated and approved by
the Panel, then forwarded to the Commission for promulgation as final ICCAT
recommendations. Panel 2 is responsible for Atlantic bluefin tuna, and its
membership includes the U.S., Canada, Japan, France, Korea, Morocco,
Portugal, and Spain:
Panel 1 Tropical Tunas Albacore, Skipjack
Panel 2 Temperate Tunas North Bluefin, Albacore
Panel 3 Temperate Tunas South Bluefin, Albacore
Panel 4 Other Species Bigeye, Atlantic Bonito,
Billfishes, Other
ICCAT Recommendations
Major bluefin tuna recommendations were made by ICCAT in 1974,
1981, 1982, 1991, and most recently in 1993. In 1974 the SCRS report
indicated that total Atlantic bluefin catches had declined from 40,000 mt in
1964-65 to 12,000 mt in 1973. The SCRS proposed two actions in light of the
declining catch; 1.) a short term reduction of fishing intensity on giants to protect
spawning fish and 2.) a long-term reduction in purse seining (and other gear
catch) of small fish. The 1974 ICCAT recommendation was 1.) prohibit the
taking of bluefin tuna less than 14 lb. with incidental catches limited to 15% of
the total landing weight, and 2.) limit the fishing mortality to "recent levels" for
one year (ICCAT 1975).The determination of "recent levels" was left up to each
member country. These conservation measures were renewed annually from
1975 through 1981.
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In 1981 ICCAT recommended stringent measures in the western Atlantic
which significantly reduced the allowable catch (ICCAT 1982). The SCRS did
its analysis in 1981 based on two separate Atlantic stocks, a western Atlantic
stock, and a separate eastern Atlantic/ Mediterranean stock. The SCRS
reported that in the western Atlantic stock levels were depleted to very low
levels, and recommended that total catch in the western Atlantic be reduced to
as near zero as feasible. ICCAT recommended that the three major contracting
parties which fish the western Atlantic, the U.S., Japan, and Canada, meet
again before February 1982 and decide the final quota. They met in Miami in
February 1982 and set the final quota at 1160 metric tons (605 U.S., 305 Japan,
250 Canada) for monitoring of the bluefin stock, and prohibited directed fishing
in the Gulf of Mexico, a traditional bluefin spawning ground.
In 1982 ICCAT recommended an increase in the western Atlantic
quota to 2660 mt citing a need for improved data from the fishery (ICCAT 1983).
The SCRS recommended that the 1981 assessments not be used because of
changes in historical data and an erroneous stock-recruitment relation used in
those efforts. New analyses using a "Virtual Population Analysis" (VPA)
technique showed significantly different estimates of stock size. The SCRS
also stated that the current 1160 mt quota was not sufficient for adequate
"scientific monitoring" of the bluefin stock. Based on these SCRS
recommendations, ICCAT recommended that the quota be increased to 2660
mt (1387 U.S., 700 Japan , 537 Canada) for scientific monitoring purposes and
that no more than 15% of the western catch be smaller than 47" fork length.
These measures were continued from 1983 through 1991.
In 1991 ICCAT recommended additional management measures in the
western Atlantic including a 10% reduction in the catch quota (ICCAT 1992).
The SCRS found that the overall exploitable biomass had declined to between
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10-23% of the 1970 level, and that large fish (8+ years) had continued to
decline since 1982 and were currently at 10% of the 1970 level. The SCRS
also found that the catch of small fish had continued, and that the increased
fishing mortality had reduced the potential for increase of the stock. The SCRS
assessment showed that the populations of older fish (10+) had not improved
since implementation of the 1982 regulations, and that high catches of small
fish had continued slowing the recovery of the entire stock. The SCRS also
raised concerns about under-reported and unreported catches based on review
of Japanese market statistics which showed additional annual catches of 200-
700 mt coming from the western Atlantic. The 1991 ICCAT recommendation
included 1.) a 10% reduction in catch for 1992/93 (2394 mt), and 2.) no sale of
bluefin less than 66 lb. /45" fork length (or limited to 8% total catch weight).
Also in 1991 a Resolution Concerning Catches of Bluefin Tuna by Non-
Contracting Parties was adopted by ICCAT in which the Commission resolved
to "encourage" non-Contracting parties fishing in the Convention area to join
and participate in ICCAT. A joint statement by the U.S., Canada , and Japan
proposed restrictions consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) on the import of Atlantic bluefin tuna from countries which are not
Contracting (member) Parties or are not participating in the ICCAT management
program.
During the 1993 ICCAT meeting the Commission again adopted new
management measures for the western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery (ICCAT
1994). ICCAT scientists reassessed the status of the western stock in 1993 and
concluded that it was continuing to decline despite strict harvesting quotas
since 1981 and would continue to do so unless catches were further reduced.
The SCRS estimated that biomass levels had declined over the past 20 years to
8-26% of the level estimated in 1975. Their analyses indicated that the
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continued catcll at 1992-93 level of 2394 mt would result in continued decline in
spawning stock biomass. They concluded that a 50% reduction from 1991
levels was necessary to just keep the stock from being depleted further. ICCAT
therefore in 1993 recommended a 50% reduction in the western Atlantic bluefin
tuna quota from 2394 mt in 1993, to 1995 mt in 1994, and finally 1200 mt in
1995. The 1995 reduction was contingent upon updated SCRS scientific
information available in 1994. ICCAT also recommended that the contracting
parties in the western Atlantic conduct studies in 1994 and 1995 and develop a
recovery program aimed at achieving a 50% increase in spawning stock
biomass by 2008.
ICCAT Management Issues
There are two major issues which have been raised concerning ICCAT
management of Atlantic bluefin tuna, the two-stock hypothesis and the apparent
lack of regulation in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. ICCAT has been
managing Atlantic bluefin tuna under the premise that two separate stocks exist,
a western stock and an eastern stock which includes the Mediterranean Sea,
since 1981. The two-stock hypothesis currently used by ICCAT is based on the
assumption that mixing of western and eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna is limited.
ICCAT has divided the Atlantic into two separate management units; 1.) west of
450W longitude and 2.) east of 450W longitude including the Mediterranean
Sea (Figure 1). These management units were defined based primarily on the
existence of two distinct spawning areas in the Gulf of Mexico and the
Mediterranean Sea.
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Figure 1, General Distribution of Bluefin Tuna in the Atlantic Ocean . Darkened
areas indicate known spawning areas. The solid line separates the ICCAT
eastern and western management units . (NRC 1994)
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Additional evidence supporting the two-stock assumption included the coastal
abundance of small fish on each side, a high proportion of tagged fish
recaptured on the same side, and relatively low catch rates by longline vessels
in the central Atlantic.
From 1969 through 1980 ICCAT had managed Atlantic bluefin tuna as a
single stock. The management measures recommended in 1974 applied to
both western and eastern countries. The SCRS in 1981 pointed out that
although scientific evidence was not sufficient to determine with certainty stock
structure, the current evidence was pointing towards two separate stocks. They
completed their assessment in 1981 for both the single and separate stock
hypotheses, and the results and suggested management measures under each
premise were quite different. Under the single stock hypothesis, the
assessment showed the abundance of Atlantic bluefin had declined to low
levels, that total catch of adult fish should be held to 9500 mt , and the catch of
small fish should be eliminated. The 9500 mt level was effectively a 20% cut in
the total Atlantic catch, and the small fish measure would have eliminated 5900
mt caught primarily (90%) in the Mediterranean. If managed as separate stocks,
the eastern component seemed stable and required no additional management
measures beyond the 1974 minimum size and mortality recommendations. The
western stock however was depleted to very low levels and the SCRS
suggested near zero catch for both adult and small bluefin. ICCAT ultimately
adopted the two stock hypothesis in 1981, made no recommendations for the
eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and recommended significant catch
reductions in the west.
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Figure 2, Total Catch of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. The western Atlantic has been
under a catch quota since 1982. The Mediterranean had record highs in 1992.
(ICCAT 1994)
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The U.S. fishing industry has argued that NMFS was instrumental in
creating and forcing IGGAT adoption of the two stock theory in order to allow the
west to take unilateral conservation sacrifices in the face of unresponsive
eastern European and Mediterranean governments (House 1993a) They feel
that the impact of the 2 stock hypothesis is that the burden of conservation has
been placed on the west, which only represents 8 % of the total Atlantic catch,
while the remaining 92% of the catch in the east goes essentially unregulated.
The original justification conceived by NMFS was arbitrary, first starting at
an equidistant dividing line between the U.S. and Europe at 40oW, and
subsequently moved by IGCAT in 1982 to 450W. They feel that the two stock
theory is not supported by NMFS tagging results which show captures of
bluefin tagged in the western Atlantic and recaptured in the eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean. The existence of a mid-Atlantic Japanese longline fishery "on-
the-line" also does not support the idea of separate stocks. The Japanese catch
in an area within 150 miles of the dividing line has increased from 11 mt in 1981
to over 1000 mt in 1991 and 1992.
While the western stock has been subjected to multiple management
measures since the adoption of the two-stock hypothesis in 1981, ICCAT has
not recommended a single measure for the eastern stock since 1974, when
ICCAT recommended an Atlantic-wide minimum size and a cap on mortality at
"recent" levels. Since the adoption of the two stock hypothesis by ICCAT in
1981, the western Atlantic fishery has operated under an array of catch quotas,
minimum sizes, no sale provisions, and spawning area restrictions. The total
western Atlantic bluefin catch has been decreased by 60% since 1974 through
implementation of catch quotas. ICCAT has not recommended conservation
and management measures for the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean since
the 1974 measures were adopted for the entire Atlantic. The total eastern
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Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin catch has increased by 40% since 1974,
and catches in the Mediterranean in 1992 were the highest ever recorded by
ICCAT at 19520 mt. The east has not complied with the 14 lb. minimum size
(Table 6), with the 1992 ICCAT Infractions Committee (ICCAT 1993) reporting
siqniflcant catches of undersized bluefin. Spawning bluefin are targeted in the
east for roe, and a significant amount of the eastern catch (>5000 mt) is either
unreported under-reported to ICCAT. A significant portion of this unreported
catch is made by non-ICCAT Mediterranean countries. ICCAT has not been
effective in the east primarily due to lack of enforcement of existing measures
and lack of new measures. While ICCAT documents the lack of compliance in
the east each year, it has not been able to do anything to address it.
Table 6, East Atlantic and Mediterranean Bluefin Tuna Catches (in Numbers)
(ICCAT 1993)
Total Catch
< 6.4 Kg
% <6.4 Kg
1988
816690
555754
60%
1989
392076
755325
34%
1990
673702
743662
47%
1991
363235
722022
33%
VI. NRC Assessment
To prepare for the 1994 ICCAT meeting, NOAA asked the National
Academy of Sciences' National Research Council to conduct an independent
assessment of the scientific basis for Atlantic bluefin tuna management (I\IRC,
1994). The NRC convened a committee of fishery managers and scientists from
several organizations and universities to conduct this technical review and
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evaluation and published its 'findings in August 1994. Given that the two most
contentious issues concerning bluefin management were the definition of
management units (i.e., 2-stock hypothesis) and the indices of abundance, the
NRC focused primarily on the scientific basis for assumptions about stock
structure and abundance used in previous stock assessments.
In addressing the 2-stock hypothesis the NRC studied stock structure and
conducted a review and analysis of tagging data. The NRC defined a fish stock
as all fish belonging to a given species that live in a particular geographic area
at a particular time. These areas may be defined by political boundaries for
fisheries management, but a stock defined this way generally will not reflect
biologically meaningful management units.
The NRC reviewed genetic studies for evidence of stock structure, and
found that most of the studies were incomplete or inadequate to address the 2-
stock issue. However, none of the studies found genetic differences between
eastern and western Atlantic bluefin tuna, which is consistent with a single
population in the Atlantic. The NRC also reviewed nongenetic studies including
microconstituent analyses. Each spawning area (the Gulf of Mexico and
Mediterranean Sea) has a different chemical elemental signature which shows
up in the bony material of the fish, and this can be used to identify the origin of a
fish caught outside the spawning area. These studies have confirmed that fish
caught in west were spawned in the Mediterranean and vice versa, supporting
the hypothesis of movement between east and west.
Tagging-recapture data provided the NRC with the strongest evidence
available for transatlantic movement. The NRC reviewed and reanalyzed
tagging data to estimate the degree of fish movement. Bluefin were tagged in
the western Atlantic from 1954-1987 with 15,000 fish tagged by NMFS. Eastern
Atlantic/Mediterranean bluefin tuna have been tagged since 1911. Tagging
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and recapture activity for both east-to-west and west-to-east migrants is
summarized in Table 7. The NRC reanalyzed this tag and recapture data and
computed east-to-west transfer rates of 2-3%, and west-to-east transfer rates of
1%.
Table 7, Atlantic Blue'fin Tuna Tag and Recapture Data
Location
Bahamas
NW Atlantic
Coastal U.S.
NW Atlantic
East Atlantic
East Atlantic
East Atlantic
Mediterranean
Mediterranean
# Released
1709
1881
468
17700
599-604
6144
107-232
3993
20-30
Size
Giant
Giant
Medium
Small
Giant
Small
Unk.
Small
Unk.
Total
Recaptured
17
81
10
2180
53
419
3
70
o
Trans-Atlantic
Recaptures
9
9
1
46
o
19
o
o
o
The NRC reviewed ICCAT's previous scientific assessments including
abundance indices (CPUE) and VPA analyses. The NRC reanalyzed the data
used to compute the abundance indices and found significant data processing
errors (by f\lMFS) which resulted in a apparent dramatic decline in bluefin tuna
in the 1992 ICCAT SCRS assessments. Once the errors were corrected by
NRC, this decline disappeared. The NRC also found ICCAT's VPA analyses
inadequate in terms of considering uncertainties, specifically mixing between
east and west. The SCRS assessments are based on a model (ADAPT) which
assumes the population is closed (i.e., no migration or mixing). The f\lRC
conducted a reassessment factoring in both the levels of mixing derived in the
tagging analysis and the corrected abundance indices. They also conducted a
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number of sensitivity runs to determine the consequences of other assumptions.
Their stock assessment results are presented in Table 8. The percentage (%)
values represent the ratio of current spawning stock size to both the 1988 level
and the 1975 level.
Table 8, NRC Stock Assessment Results (Ratios)
Emigration Stock Size (N8+)
East West 1993/1988 1993/1975
a. ICCAT Base Case
b. NRC Base Case
c. Increase Emigration
d. All Ages Emigrate
0% 0%
2% 1%
3% 1%
2% 1%
76%
92%
127%
130%
14%
18%
36%
43%
Allowing exchange (emigration) from east to west results in a more
optimistic appraisal of the status of the western stock than the ICCAT stock
assessment. The ICCAT Case, which does not account for mixing (0%), yields
similar results to the 1993 ICCAT SCRS assessment with the current spawning
abundance at 76% relative to 1988, and 14% relative to 1975. The NRC Base
Case, which has factored in a conservative level of mixing (2%), shows little
change in abundance of the spawning stock since 1988 (92%). Increasing
emigration to 3% results in an increased spawning abundance (127%) relative
to 1988 (i.e., the stock has grown). The most optimistic NRC excursion (d.)
assumed that all ages emigrate (cases b. and c. assumed movement of only 0-6
year old fish) and resulted in even a larger spawning stock. Based on its
assessment the !\IRC concluded that the current abundance of bluefin tuna in
the western Atlantic has been stable since 1988, and that the absolute level of
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the spawning stock (N8+) is 2-5 times greater than ICCAT's 1993 estimate. At
the same time the NRC assessment shows that the spawning stock has
declined substantially since the 1970s, to about 80% of its 1975 level. (Figure
3).
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Figure 3, NRC Assessment of Spawning Stock Biomass. Case 1 is the !\IRC
base case(2% mixing). Case 2 is includes 3% mixing. Case 7 is ICCAT's
assumption (0% mixing) but with data processing errors corrected. (NRC 1994)
The NRC concluded that the available biological evidence was
consistent with a single stock hypothesis in the north Atlantic, and that their
reevaluation of tagging data confirms enough mixing between the western and
eastern Atlantic to alter previous ICCAT SCRS stock assessments. The NRC
also concluded that the ICCAT SCRS assessments of abundance of eastern
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and western Atlantic bluefin tuna do not provide the most defensible
interpretation of available scientific data, and reanalyses show no evidence that
the abundance of western Atlantic bluefin tuna has changed significantly
between 1988 and 1992.
The NRC assessment certainly casts doubt upon the management of
Atlantic bluefin tuna under ICCAT by disputing the scientific basis for ICCAT's
separate management practices for eastern and western Atlantic bluefin tuna.
The key issue concerning stock structure is not whether one or two stocks exist,
but the extent of movement between these stocks. ICCAT and NMFS stock
assessments have not accounted for mixing; they assumed a closed system
even though their own tagging data proved conclusively that bluefin do migrate
in both directions across the Atlantic. The incorporation of a low level of mixing
by the NRC turned a significantly declining stock into at least a stable stock.
Given the emphasis placed on scientific assessment by both ICCAT and NMFS,
it seems almost inconceivable that they had not previously examined these
sensitivities. The "best available" scientific data does not necessarily imply
that it is adequate or reliable.
l\IMFS responded to the NRC assessment by convening a team of
experts to evaluate the NRC findings and make recommendations about policy
and management issues raised by the report. (NOAA 1994) This task force was
to work closely with U.S. ICCAT Advisors and Commissioners; fisl1ing industry
groups; conservation organizations; and Congress to help establish the U.S.
position on Atlantic bluefin tuna for the upcoming 1994 ICCAT meeting. NMFS
was encouraged that the stocks appear to have stabilized since 1988, but
pointed out that it is clear that the stocks are only a fraction (20%) of what they
once were. Finally NMFS did take credit for the NRC findings given the fact that
38
NOAA commissioned the study, "... the study reflects our commitment to seek
the very best science for our policy and management decisions" (NOAA 1994).
VII. Interest Group Positions
Fishing Industry
As a result of increasing regulatory restrictions and environmental group
involvement in the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery, 'fishermen and industry have
organized under various groups including the East Coast Tuna Association,
Blue Water Fishermen's Association, Coalition of United States Bluefin Tuna
User Groups, United Boatmen of New Jersey and New York, General Category
Tuna Association, and Montauk Boatmen's and Captain's Association. There
are several bluefin tuna management issues which these groups share in
common. They feel that international management of Atlantic bluefin tuna is
required and support U.S. participation in ICCAT. Commercial fishermen and
industry believe that the current system of bluefin tuna management through
ICCAT and NMFS is fundamentally sound, but do believe that some major
changes are required to improve the process. They suggest implementation of
both effective Atlantic-wide international management and an improved
domestic management system.
Fishermen do not support further reductions in the western Atlantic quota .
They generally feel that they have been subjected to unwarranted and
unequitable quotas in the western Atlantic, while the unrestricted fishermen in
the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean have benefited from their sacrifices and
logged record catches in recent years. They feel that they have shouldered the
entire Atlantic bluefin tuna conservation burden, while they only harvest 4% of
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the total catch. They feel that imposing regulations only in the west, which
represents only a small fraction of the total Atlantic catch, will not work. They feel
that ICCAT should focus its conservation efforts on the eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean.
Fishermen strongly disagree with the scientific basis for U.S. and ICCAT
decisions, which has been driven by stock assessments based on the two-
stock hypothesis. Fishermen feel that NMFS and ICCAT stock assessments
have more political basis than scientific basis. They believe that Congress
through provisions in the ATCA and Magnuson Act sought to protect fishermen
from being disadvantaged with respect to foreign fishermen, but that
nevertheless NMFS has taken positions to unilaterally restrict U.S. fishermen.
Commercial and recreational fishermen do differ on the domestic
management of the bluefin quota, specifically where should the authority
reside? Recreational fishermen favor "equitable" regulations consistent with
FMPs prepared and implemented under the Magnuson Act and the Regional
Councils. They disagree with past NMFS allocation practices, especially the
traditional 25% purse seine allocation and current 8% tolerance on small fish
which severely restricts recreational and charter fishermen. Commercial
fishermen certainly oppose transfer of any authority from Secretary of
Commerce to the regional councils given that the councils are currently
dominated by recreational and other non-commercial interests, which would
leave them with inadequate representation.
The fishing industry is using the NRC findings to build support for a
rescinding of the recent ICCAT quota reductions (1992-93 10% and the 1994-
95 50% reduction) , which would bring the western Atlantic back to its 1991
quota of 2660 mt, which prevailed from 1982-1991 (Ruais 1994). They argue
that the decline of the stock stopped in 1988 according to the NRC under a
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2660 mt quota which was severely abused. The U.S. failed to comply with
minimum size restrictions from 1983-1991 and the 2660 mt quota was
exceeded 6 out of the 9 years it was implemented. Given that these abuses
have been corrected since 1991, 2660 mt should be "safe" until more accurate
assessments can be made by ICCAT in the future, factoring in NRC
recommendations.
The fishing industry certainly has the ear of their politicians. The U.S.
Congress recently expressed its concern regarding the management of Atlantic
bluefin tuna with House Concurrent Resolution 169 (House 1993b). Its purpose
was to encourage greater international cooperation and urge reconsideration of
current management programs regarding Atlantic bluefin tuna. The Resolution
made several findings and specified several actions in response to those
findings. It found that the Atlantic bluefin tuna stock had declined significantly
over the past 25 years; that the two-stock theory and the 45 degree dividing line
were arbitrary; that ICCAT measures for the western stock had been
implemented but those for the eastern stock had not; and that harvest by non-
member nations was adversely affecting ICCAT efforts. The Resolution states
the sense of Congress that U.S. and ICCAT should continue to promote
conservation of Atlantic bluefin tuna; that tile U.S. should seek compliance by
ICCAT members or threaten certification under the Pelly Amendment to the
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967; that the U.S. and ICCAT study the validity of
the two stock working hypothesis; and finally that the U.S should encourage
non-members to participate in the ICCAT process and abide by its
recommended measures.
In response to the 1993 quota reductions and the 1994 NRC findings
there has been significant political interest in the U.S. ICCAT position. A letter
dated October 1993 from Congressmen Studds and Senator Mitchell to the
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Secretary of Commerce certainly echoed U.S. fishermen and industry concerns
regarding lack of compliance by eastern countries at the expense of significant
sacrifices by U.S. fishermen (Senate 1993). A more recent September 1994
letter from Congressmen Torkildsen of Massachusetts to NMFS called for
implementation of the NRC recommendations and a rescinding of ICCAT's
1991 and 1993 quota reductions under threat of formal hearings (Torkildsen
1994). The fishing industry seems to have the ear of politicians. While political
pressure did not seem to influence NMFS or ICCAT decisions in 1993, this
more recent "post-NRC" pressure may have an impact in 1994.
Conservationists
The western environmental movement has made bluefin tuna a
"flagship" cause , using ICCAT's own scientific assessments to support their
actions. Conservationists including the Center for Marine Conservation (CMC),
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and National Audubon Society have organized
under an joint initiative known as "ICCAT Watch" . ICCAT Watch was created in
1992 to highlight the failure of ICCAT to conserve bluefin tuna and focus public
attention on ICCAT's mismanagement of Atlantic fisheries. Conservationists
feel that ICCAT management has not been effective given the fact that several
fish stocks under its purview, including bluefin tuna, swordfish, and marlin have
declined by 50-90% over the past 20 years. They support ICCAT's proposed
50% reduction in western Atlantic harvest levels in 1995, but feel that "even this
seeming draconian measure may not be enough to reverse the bluefin's
decline" (England 1994). Conservationists feel that the bluefin tuna represents
everything wrong with fisheries management, and that the unusually high price
that bluefin commands in the Japanese market will chase the species toward
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extinction (Craft 1994). "The result of this ocean-going buffalo hunt is a bluefin
breeding population that plummeted 90% over the last 20 years, a decline more
severe than that of the endangered African elephant (England 1994)."
They feel that increasing pressure 'from conservation groups has been
responsible for ICCAT conservation and management measures (quotas, no-
sale provisions, etc.) for western Atlantic bluefin in 1991 and 1993. They first
petit ioned in 1991 to have the bluefin tuna listed under the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
the first time a marine fish had been proposed. CITES is a treaty with
approximately 120 signatories designed to control the commerce of species
endangered by international trade. An Appendix I listing under CITES for
species threatened with extinction significantly restricts or constrains
international trade of those species. An Appendix II listing for species thought to
be endangered only mandates monitoring and documentation of international
trade, and certification by each country that their commerce is not harmful to the
listed species. In 1991 the National Audubon Society proposed that western
Atlantic bluefin tuna be listed under CITES Appendix I, which would have
suspended exports to Japan. The U.S. chose not to seek a listing, and
consequently Audubon and the WWF got Sweden (who in the past had a
productive bluefin fishery) to propose both the western Atlantic bluefin under
Appendix I and the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin under Appendix
II. The Append ix I listing would have suspended 1% of Japan's total tuna
imports, but 15-20% of its bluefin imports . Under extreme pressure from the
Japanese, Canadian, and U.S. fishing industry, Sweden withdrew its petition at
the 1992 CITES meeting in Kyoto, Japan, conditioned on ICCAT pursuing future
quota reductions. Although this effort ultimately failed, ICCAT did reduce the
western Atlantic quota by 10% in 1991, and again by 50 % in 1993.
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Conservationists still felt that an Appendix I listing may be required if
ICCAT in 1993 did not implement adequate conservation and rebuilding
measures. They also felt that and Appendix II listing might be the best way to
monitor Atlantic wide catch of bluefin, including non-ICCAT catch. In 1994
Audubon, WWF, and the CMC formally petitioned to list the Atlantic bluefin
under CITES Appendix II. Kenya proposed listing the Atlantic bluefin on
Appendix lion June 10, 1994. Under pressure from Japan, which supplies
much of Kenya's foreign aid, the listing proposal was withdrawn less than one
month later. Conservationists, given the expected significant quota cut by
ICCAT in 1995, did not pursue an Atlantic bluefin tuna CITES listing any further.
No marine fish were proposed for listing on CITES Appendices at the Ninth
meeting of CITES, held in November, 1994 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
Conservationists feel that the NRC Report has added to the controversy
more than it has resolved Atlantic bluefin tuna management issues. They feel
that ICCAT should honor its mandate to make Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries
sustainable by reaffirming the planned 1995 35% quota reduction. They do
realize that the proposed reduction is subject to review at the 1994 ICCAT
meeting, and given the recent NRC findings, ICCAT may cancel the proposed
reduction. They feel that the NRC findings are being used by the commercial
tuna industry to pressure on Congress into pushing for the abandonment of the
scheduled 1995 quota cuts. While the tuna industry has seized upon the NRC
findings to justify abandoning the quota, conservationists feel that no data has
come to light, in the !\IRC report or elsewhere, that would warrant such action.
Given the fact that the NRC findings show the bluefin population has
"plummeted" by 80% since 1975, and that the bluefin is showing no sign of
recovery or response despite quota cuts enacted since 1991, they feel the 50%
quota reduction must be implemented in 1995. By any standard, an 80%
44
decline in less than two decades is catastrophic, and leaves the western
Atlantic population in acute need of rebuilding (Sutton 1994).
The conservationists, who had based their actions on primarily on
ICCAT and I\JMFS assessments which showed a significantly declining western
stock, have been undercut by the NRC assessment, and have lost the
momentum and pressure they were able to generate in the early 1990's.
Fishermen appear to have a much stronger case against further quota cuts in
the western Atlantic given the apparent (NRC) stabilization of the western stock.
VIII. 1994 ICCAT Decision
ICCAT held its 1994 meeting in Madrid, Spain from November 27 to
December 2, 1994 during which it made some fairly significant and historic
decisions regarding Atlantic bluefin tuna. Conservation and management
recommendations were made for both the western Atlantic and the eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean. In the west, the planned 1995 35% quota reduction
was abandoned, and replaced with a 10% increase. ICCAT established a new
2200 mt quota for 1995 and 1996 under which the U.S. was allocated 1311 mt,
Canada 535 mt, and Japan 353 mt. A schedule was also developed which
determines the future share (%) allocation of any future quota levels in the
western Atlantic .
ICCAT finally recommended an array of new measures in the east; the
first recommendations since 1974. Recommended measures for the eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean include:
1.) Prevent an any increase in fishing mortality rate for 1995 and beyond.
2.) Prevent any catch by vessels under their jurisdictions in 1995 in
excess of the level of catch in 1993/94.
3.) Reduce catch from the 1993/94 level by 25% by 1998.
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4.) Cooperate in the development of a long term recovery plan by 1998.
5.) Comply with the Contracting Parties obligations to implement the
1974 recommendation of a 6.4 kg minimum size.
6.) Prevent catch of age 0 fish « 1.8 kg).
7.) Provide sufficient data requested by SCRS to improve stock
assessments.
IX. Conclusions
This independent review of Atlantic bluefin tuna management concludes
that ICCAT has improved management slowly over the past 25 years, and given
their most recent 1994 recommendations, has established an "effective"
management program at the international level. ICCAT has certainly benefited
from active participation by the primary interest groups in recent years, who
have continually raised issues with stock assessments, quota levels, and
equitable regulation over the range of the stock. Management at the federal
level cannot be considered effective, due primarily to NMFS's continued
inability to fairly allocate the U.S. quota.
This management system, at both the international and federal level, has
been shown to respond to political pressure, and both conservationists and the
fishing industry have influenced policy. The attempt by conservation groups in
the early 1990's to list Atlantic bluefin tuna under CITES influenced ICCAT's
decision to reduce quotas in the western Atlantic in 1991 and 1993. These
actions caused the fishing industry to organize and push, through their
politicians, for more equitable regulation across the Atlantic, and caused NOAA
to commission an independent review of ICCAT's management assumptions
and scientific assessments. Both of these actions apparently had a significant
impact on ICCAT's most recent management decisions. Had these groups not
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been so active over the past 5 years, the western fishery probably would still be
operating under a 1983 quota level which had no scientific basis, ICCAT would
be reporting declining stock conditions based on flawed scientific assessments,
and 90 % of the Atlantic blue'fin "fishery would still be virtually unregulated.
Ludwig, Hillman, and Walters (1993) suggest that effective management
approaches usually consider a variety of possible strategies and hypotheses,
favor actions that are robust to uncertainties, and finally favor actions that are
reversible. Perhaps ICCAT's recent "reversal" concerning the western Atlantic
quota is evidence of an effective approach.
This examination of Atlantic bluefin tuna management illuminates the
major issues faced at both the international and federal levels. At the
international level the issues include reliable scientific assessment, compliance,
and fair and equitable management over the range of the species. At the
federal level the issues are fair allocation and overcapitalization. ICCAT's
recent 1994 conservation and management recommendations have resolved
two of the international management issues. The increase in the western
Atlantic quota obviously reflects a reassessment of stock conditions in light of
the NRC findings. ICCAT's recommendation of new measures for the eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean should alleviate the concerns of western fishermen
and politicians as to the fairness of ICCAT regulation over the range of the
stock. The remaining unresolved issue is compliance. The east has yet to
comply with ICCAT's "non-binding" 1974 recommendations. The problem faced
by ICCAT is not determining proper conservation measures, or getting member
nations to adopt those measures, it's gaining compliance under a system which
has no clear way to enforce them.
At the federal level, both the allocation and overcapitalization issues
remain unresolved. I\lMFS has proven over the past 15 years that it cannot
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fairly distribute the ICCAT quota by continuing to allocate a substantial share to
5 purse seine vessels on the basis of "traditional" access. Recent studies by
both f\lMFS and the Audubon Society have shown the current allocation to be
disproportionate, and have shown that fairer and more equitable distribution,
increased employment, and increased economic benefits could be realized
through reallocation . For the past 20 years under the ATCA, fair allocation of
the ICCAT quota was not mandated . Under the Magnuson Act as amended by
the 1990 Amendments, the development of an Atlantic bluefin tuna FMP is
mandated, and allocation under that FMP is required to be fair and equitable.
All of the more equitable allocation schemes which have been examined result
in reductions in the strictly commercial categories , especially the purse seine
category, and increases in the General and Angling categories which benefits
recreational fishermen. Contention at the international level has been reduced
given ICCAT's 1994 recommendations, but more controversy at the federal
level will occur as domestic management of Atlantic tuna moves away from the
ATCA and more in line with the Magnuson Act, starting with development of an
Atlantic bluefin tuna FMP.
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